Dimanche 26 Février 2006

2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey

The 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey addresses one of the highest priorities in the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. These survey results are based on the responses of

2066 organizations. The purpose of this survey is to gain an accurate understanding

of what computer security incidents are being experienced by the full spectrum of

sizes and types of organizations within the United States. The 23-question survey

addressed a wide variety of issues including: computer security technologies used,

security incident types, and actions taken, as well as emerging technologies and trends

such as wireless and biometrics. The survey was conducted in four states including

Iowa, Nebraska, New York, and Texas and was performed by the corresponding FBI

offices in those areas. The survey was conducted in such a way that recipients could

respond anonymously.

This survey is not to be confused with the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security

Survey, which has been conducted for several years, and has a somewhat different

focus, method, and restricted number of respondents.

KEY FINDINGS:

• There are a variety of computer security technologies that organizations are increasingly investing

in to combat the relentless, evolving, sophisticated threats, both internal and external. Despite

these efforts, well over 5,000 computer security incidents were reported with 87% of respondents

experiencing some type of incident.

• In many of the responding organizations, a common theme of frustration existed with the nonstop

barrage of viruses, Trojans, worms, and spyware.

• Although the usage of antivirus, antispyware, firewalls, and antispam software is almost

universal among the survey respondents, many computer security threats came from within the

organizations.

• Of the intrusion attempts that appeared to have come from outside the organizations, the most

common countries of origin appeared to be United States, China, Nigeria, Korea, Germany,

Russia, and Romania.

• An overwhelming 91% of organizations that reported computer security incidents to law

enforcement were satisfied with the response of law enforcement.

• Almost 90% of respondents were not familiar with the InfraGard (www.infragard.net) organization

that is a joint effort by the FBI and industry to educate and share information related to threats to

U.S. infrastructure.

• The survey respondents were very interested in being better informed on how to prevent computer

crimes. Over 75% of respondents voiced a desire to attend an informational session hosted by

their local FBI office.

DETAILED FINDINGS:

About the Questions:

The 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey is unique in that the questions were compiled based on input

from a large number and variety of organizations. Input for the questions was provided by both a large

number of Special Agent computer intrusion investigators, supervisors, and Investigative Analysts

within the FBI, as well as a variety of computer security professionals within the computer security

and digital forensics communities. For the purposes of this survey, Computer Security Incident is

defined as: Any real or suspected adverse event in relation to the security of computer systems or

computer networks.

About the Recipients/Respondents:

Approximately 24,000 organizations received the 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey. These recipients

were from 430 different cities (with populations ranging from less than 1,000 to New York City, with a

population of more than 8 million) from four states: Iowa, Nebraska, New York and Texas.

About The Methodology:

A letter was mailed to the recipients in mid June 2005. The following criteria were used to select the

organizations which were provided by a list broker as well as other sources:

1. Organizations that had been in existence for three or more years.

2. Organizations that had five or more employees.

3. Organizations that fell within the geographic area requested

(those 400+ cities covered by the FBI offices that participated).

4. Organizations that had $1,000,000 or more in annual revenue.

Organizations had to meet all four of these criteria in order to be selected. The letter was sent

from the FBI and gave a brief description of the 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey project. The

letter conveyed the anonymous nature of the survey and directed recipients to a web address as

well as provided a userid and password. Recipients had approximately five weeks to complete the

survey. They were also given the option to request a written version although less than 1% did. 2066

individuals completed the survey. No reminders were sent.

Question 1: In what general

area is your organization

located?

While responses from the survey came from

several hundred different cities, there were a

small number of primarily urban areas that made

up the vast majority of respondents. Over 90% of

the survey recipients were in the Austin, Houston,

New York City, Iowa, Nebraska, and San Antonio

metro areas. The Houston territory, which

covers 40 counties, had the highest number of

respondents with 762 while the Iowa/Nebraska

territory had the highest percentage survey

response with almost 13%.

Question 2: What industry best describes your organization?

There are many ways in which organizations and businesses are categorized. Nineteen different categories were offered

as well as an ‘Other’ category. While responses were received from every one of the categories, Financial (14%), Medical

(11%), and Professional (9%) had the highest number of respondents.

Question 3: How many

employees does your

organization have?

The survey respondents came from organizations

from a broad size range from less than ten

employees to well over 10,000 employees.

The majority were, however, from with small to

midsize organizations with over 51% coming from

organizations from 10 – 99 employees.

Question 4: What best

describes your title?

The job title of the respondents indicated that

they were well qualified to answer the survey’s

questions. The largest group is ‘IT Managers’

(28%) with ‘System Administrators’ making up

another 21%. Most small organizations would not

have a Chief Security Officer or Chief Information

Security Officer. This would account for only 2%

of respondents indicating CSO/CISO instead of

the more general IT related titles.

Question 5: What level of

gross income does your

organization have?

As expected, the largest gross income category

by far was the ‘Under $5,000,000’ (46%) with

the $10,000,000 - $99,000,000 category being a

distant 2nd at 16%. Over 2% of respondents come

from organizations with over a billion dollars of

gross income.

Question 6: Security technologies used by your organization:

(select all that apply)

There was a large variety of security technologies being used among respondents. Usage of Antivirus software was almost

universal with 98%. Firewalls were close behind with over 90% either using software or hardware firewalls. Operating

system safeguards, such as limits on which users could install software, password complexity requirements, and periodic

password changes were used by about half of respondents. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) proved to be a popular means

of achieving security with a 46% response. Advanced techniques such as biometrics (4%) and smartcards (7%) were

implemented infrequently; however, it is anticipated that these numbers may increase in future surveys. Organizations

used on average 7.8 of the security methods listed.

Interestingly, having more security measures did not mean a reduction in attacks. In fact there was a significantly positive

correlation between the number of security measures employed and the number of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is

likely that organizations that are attractive targets of attacks are also most likely to both experience attack attempts and to

employ more aggressive computer security measures. Also, organizations employing more technologies would likely be

better able to be aware of computer security incidents aimed at their organizations.

Question 7: Which types of computer security incidents has your

organization detected within the last 12 months? (select all that apply)

Further analysis of the responses to this question indicate that the vast majority of respondents (87%) experienced some

type of computer security incident. The average responding organization experienced several (2.75) different types of

computer security incidents with each type potentially occurring multiple times (such as viruses and port scans) to an

organization. Over 79% had been affected by spyware and not surprisingly almost 84% had been affected by a virus

attack at least one time within the last 12 months, despite the almost universal usage of Antivirus software mentioned in

the previous question. Port scans being at only 33% is a strong indicator that many respondents are not detecting the

almost unavoidable port scans most networks experience. This may imply that even the 5,389 reported computer security

incident types indicated by individual organizations may be significantly lower than the actual number. As expected, adult

pornography was fairly high on the list of incident types at number five (395 responses) out of fifteen, with over 22% of

organizations dealing with this issue. Although adult pornography is not illegal as child pornography is, it is against the

policy of most organizations.

New York had the lowest percentage of organizations experiencing unauthorized access, but the highest percentage of

experiencing insider abuse, laptop theft, telecom fraud, viruses, and website defacement. Austin, being the most high

tech area surveyed, was home to the organizations most likely (over 91%) to have at least one type of computer security

incident.

Question 8: How many computer

security incidents has your

organization had within the last

12 months?

As indicated in the previous question’s results, 87% of

respondents experienced a computer security incident with

only 277 implying that they did not have such an issue. Just

over half of the responders to this question indicated that

they had experience 1-4 incidents. Almost 20% of responses

to this question indicated that they had experienced 20 or

more such incidents. Large organizations (with gross income

greater than one billion dollars) were more than twice as

likely to be in the ’20 or more attacks’ category (45.5% of

these larger organizations, compared to 19.2% of overall

respondents). 40% of education and state government

organizations had 20 or more incidents.

Question 9: Has your organization

experienced unauthorized

access to computer systems

within the last 12 months?

The broad definition of ‘computer security incident’ (see the

‘About the Questions’ section) leads to a large number of

victims in questions seven and eight. In question nine, the

more restrictive category of organizations that experienced

‘unauthorized access’ to computer systems (this would not

include viruses and port scans for example) is understandably

smaller, but still significant. While an average of 13% knew

that they experienced unauthorized access to their systems,

44% of educational, 31% of federal government, and 25%

of transportation had experienced unauthorized access.

An additional 24% stated that they did not know whether

they had experienced such unauthorized access. This

underscores the difficulty of organizations in having the

expertise and resources to be aware of computer intrusions,

much less guard against or prevent such breaches. 63%

indicated that they had not had unauthorized access.

Question 10: How many unauthorized

access incidents were from within

your organization?

Over 44% of respondents to this question had experienced

intrusions from within their organization. This is a strong

indicator that internal controls are extremely important

and should not be under emphasized while concentrating

efforts on deterring outside hackers. (It should be noted that

some of the 232 respondents mentioned above could have

been aware of computer security incidents originating from

both within the organization as well as other such incidents

originating outside the organization. Only respondents who

answered ‘Yes’ to question 9 were tabulated for questions

10 and 11.)

Question 11: How many

unauthorized access incidents

were from outside your

organization?

Overall, there were over twice as many unauthorized

access incidents coming from outside the organization than

there were from within, which underlines the importance

of Intrusion Prevention/Detection Systems as well as

firewalls, logs, password complexity, and other technology

and physical security measures.

25% that said in question nine that they had experience

unauthorized access believed that they had been intruded

upon from both inside and outside their organization.

Question 12: What country was the most common source of the

intrusion attempts against your organization?

Question twelve drilled even deeper by trying to identify which countries were the most common source of the intrusion

attempts. A surprising 53% of those organizations that had in the previous question identified an intrusion as coming from

outside their organization also identified the country of origin. While 36 countries appear on the list, seven of the countries

appeared to be the source for 75% of the intrusions. Two of the countries, USA and China, seem to be the source of over

50% of the intrusions. Difficulty tracking IP addresses and prosecution in China combined with other economic, military, and

political concerns make this an unusually troubling statistic, especially when considering the potential impact of industrial

espionage and state sponsored cyber warfare efforts. Organizations with higher revenue (greater than $5 million) were

more than twice as likely to identify China as the source of the intrusion attempt. The number of positive responses to this

question (176) is low enough that it is difficult to identify statistically significant trends with a high degree of probability.

Evidence of an intrusion that indicates a particular country may not be conclusive since computer hackers often use

proxies and Trojanized computers in other countries to mask their identity and make detection difficult. An example of this

type of stepping-stone attack would be a Romanian hacker that uses a proxy computer in China to access a compromised

computer in the United States. This U.S. based computer would then be used to perform the computer intrusion. Those

investigating the incident may falsely conclude that the source was within the United States.

Question 13: What approximate dollar cost would you assign to the following types of incidents

within the last 12 months? (business lost, consultant time, employee hours spent, ...).

While the vast majority of respondents were on the low end of each of the eleven categories as far as dollar loss, the financial impact is still very

significant. The virus, worm, and Trojan category was over three times larger than any other category with almost $12,000,000 in losses. Simple

laptop/PDA theft was the second highest category of financial loss with over $3,000,000.

In this question we can see that:

- 1324 (75.1%) of the 1762 organizations incurred a financial loss because of computer security incidents.

- This would indicate that 64.1% of the 2066 survey respondents incurred a financial loss.

- The average cost was over $24,000 each for the 1324 companies that indicated they did have a computer security incident.

Let’s take a look at what the impact of computer intrusions might be in the entire U.S. as opposed to this sample of 2066 respondents. Conservative

figures are intentionally used in the following extrapolation. While losses of approximately $32,000,000 are documented through this survey, the

sample size is only one organization out of every 6292 across the U.S. (given an estimated 13,000,000 organizations). It is debatable whether

64.1% of the non-surveyed organizations would have experienced a financial loss from a computer security incident as is the case with those that

responded. Some would argue that many of the organizations that responded did so because they had experienced a loss and were sensitized to

the issue of computer security. Others might argue 64.1% is too low because as companies have been shown to be hesitant to report their crime, the

same organizations would be hesitant to complete a computer crime survey in which they are asked about facts surrounding the intrusion.

That being said, in an effort to be conservative, if the percentage of victims were 20% instead of 64.1% among those that did not receive a survey,

this would be 2.8 million U.S. organizations experiencing at least one computer security incident with each of these 2.8 million organizations incurring

a $24,000 average loss. This would total $67.2 billion per year or $7.6 million per hour. This figure is more than 1/2% of the entire U.S. Gross

Domestic Product. While the loss figures are rough approximations, they are very conservative, assuming that non-survey respondents were only

one third as likely to have experienced a financial loss. This clearly brings to light the high cost of computer crime to individual organizations and

the economy as a whole. These figures did not include much of the staff, technology, time, and software employed to prevent such incidents. These

figures also do not begin to address the losses of individuals who are victims of computer crime (intrusions, identity theft, etc.) or computer crime

victims in other countries.

publié par Adel publié dans : neohack
Jeudi 23 Février 2006

 

 

 

 

Spam is not merely annoying: it is also a serious drain on the resources of ISPs, other organizations, and Internet users. Sending Spam mail may seem like a cheap and convenient way to amplify marketing efforts, yet honest businesses rarely employ this questionable marketing tool. Firstly, nobody wishes to receive unsolicited junk mail. Secondly, it is considered both an annoyance and an intrusion of privacy. Thirdly, each sent e-mail message contributes to Internet traffic and uses up bandwidth. An e-mail message does not reach its recipient instantaneously; instead, it is relayed by any number of systems en route until it reaches its final destination. Spam mail is often sent out in thousands or hundreds of thousands of copies, to huge numbers of unwitting recipients. This large load of messages often causes network problems and congestion, meaning that third parties as well as message recipients are suffering because some inconsiderate person or company has pumped half a million copies of a message through the Internet. Unfortunately, there are many such worthless members of society.

 

For more information on Spam, refer to the links at the end of this document for some excellent reviews of the problem.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is a difficult issue. Spammers rarely use their regular e-mail addresses for the following reasons, among others:

 

  1. Their Internet Service Providers will realize they are Spamming, and will take steps to prevent future Spam (for example, by deleting Spammer's e-mail accounts)

     

  2. Spammers could become the victims of mail-bombing, as thousands of irate Spam recipients strike back with messages of their own

     

Spammers therefore rely on anonymous e-mail addresses such as those available from free e-mail providers. Sometimes the addresses you see on Spam messages are invalid (faked). It is important to realize where the responsibility for Spam lies. Make no mistake: Spammers are often reasonably skilled frauds and thieves as well as highly annoying. Many Spammers have developed specific strategies of Spamming in order to avoid responsibility for their actions, or to avoid mail blocking and filtering:

 

  1. They relay Spam messages off the mail server of an innocent third party, in which case even more damage is incurred by the on-line population in general. This technique requires an "open relay". It is Outblaze policy to avoid open relays entirely.

     

  2. They use the "drop box" strategy. This consists of sending mail out from an account that allows Spam, but putting another address in the "Reply to:" message header, so that anyone replying to the message is actually sending mail to an account that did not originate the Spam. Many Spammers want to send out ads or sales info and do not expect a reply. By drop boxing they are forging their e-mail addresses and relieving themselves of accountability. Recipients of Spam should always check the full message headers to determine the origin of the Spam.

     

  3. Spoofing. This fairly complex technique makes a message appear as if it is coming from an address that did not originate the message.

     

  4. Including a paragraph claiming that the law sanctions Spam as long as there is a "remove from list" address in the Spam message, or similar variations of this obtuse argument. Do not fall for this trick, as the "remove from list" address is almost always a sham. Not only do you generate useless traffic if you try to remove yourself from a large number of "lists", but in some cases Spammers will be delighted to put an "active"; mark next to your name on their address databases upon receipt of your complaint. Spammers are dishonest people employing dishonest tactics. Don't trust them, report them.

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Outblaze powers a large number of free e-mail Web sites, which unfortunately are the first place that Spammers choose to set up their Spam accounts. Outblaze technology prohibits users from sending mass mail, however Outblaze can do little about the drop box approach. Nor can Outblaze accept responsibility for spoofing, or Spammers who define a fake series of message headers to create the illusion that a message is coming from a particular site innocent of Spamming.

 

For example, user annoyingperson@unitedspam.com is sending out half a million messages a day in order to advertise his miserable pyramid scheme. His Spam messages, however, look as if they are coming from innocentfellow@outblaze-site.com, because the message headers have been falsified or the message has been spoofed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The most important thing is to examine your full message headers to determine where the message really came from. The "From:" header that is commonly shown in basic message header displays can be easily faked! It is harder to fake the complete message header, which can provide useful information about the message. Outblaze technology allows users to see the full message headers of all e-mail messages.

 

Any users that are suspected of Spamming from an Outblaze site, or of using an Outblaze site for drop boxing or spoofing, should be reported immediately. We will investigate the user and take action if we determine that he/she is guilty.

 

You may contact abuse@outblaze.com, or the specific Powered by Outblaze Web site from which you received the junk mail.

 

Spoofing and drop boxing are usually beyond the absolute control and responsibility of Outblaze. Outblaze will do the utmost to prevent Spam, but we ask the recipients of junk mail to understand that very often Outblaze is not the originator of such messages, but one of the victims! The solutions to spoofing and drop boxing are complex and involve co-operation between a number of Web sites and ISPs. Refer to the links below for more information.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.cauce.org -- the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE), one of the valiant organizations dedicated to fighting Spam. Includes information on Spam and how to prevent it. Lend your support to this worthy cause or one like it!

 

http://www.mail-abuse.org -- Mail Abuse Prevention System, a non-profit organization whose mission is to defend the Internet against Spammers. Take a look at their Realtime Blackhole List (RBL) information

 

http://www.efuse.com/Grow/postage_due.html -- Spam and the damage it causes

 

http://www.tincher.to/antispam.htm -- Comprehensive links and information on Spam

 

http://www.efuse.com/Grow/direct_email_marketing_.html -- Direct e-mail marketing tips

 

http://www.mail-abuse.org/rbl/manage.html -- Ethical management of mailing lists

 

http://www.cauce.org/about/resources.shtml -- Various resources on the Internet to help in the fight against Spam

 

Determining the origin of Spam

It is extremely important to identify the origin of a message. A useful technique in doing this is the correct analysis of the message headers contained in every e-mail message, which provide useful information on the message's origin and path. A little training is required to read message headers, but the links below should furnish the necessary information in a matter of minutes:

 

http://combat.uxn.com/tracing.html -- Tracing Spam and reading message headers-- Who do I complain to?

 

http://www.pop-cram-spam.net/SMTP.htm -- reading message headers

 

http://netdemon.net/tutorials/whois.txt -- WHOIS, one of the most useful tools for tracking down a Spammer's location

 

http://samspade.org/ -- several useful tools available here

 

http://chickenboner.com/antispam/ -- how to analyse a spam message, what to do about it, and several useful links

 

http://www.spamfree.org/resources/header_reading.html -- Free resources from the Forum for Responsible and Ethical Email

 

http://home.att.net/~marjie1/ -- Dedicated to those with little or no experience in fighting against Internet Abuse

 

Spam complaint boilerplates

 

http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~af380/boilerplates.links.html -- Offers boilerplates for categories of Spam, so you don't have to write a whole new message every time you report abuse to an ISP or Web site

 

publié par Adel publié dans : neohack
Lundi 20 Février 2006

publié par Adel publié dans : neohack
Lundi 20 Février 2006

SpyMaster, l'espion aux habits de MSN Messenger


L'éditeur de sécurité Panda Software signale la propagation de SpyMaster.A, un cheval de Troie (qualifié de "redoutable") qui a la fâcheuse tendance à retenir toute l'activité des PC connectés fonctionnant sous Windows.
En effet, ce 'trojan' est en fait un 'keylogger' qui enregistre toutes les frappes clavier (les 'login' et mots de passe), les créations ou les modifications de fichiers, les sites Web visités, et qui envoie toutes ces informations sensibles vers un site distant à des fins frauduleuses. Ces informations sont planquées dans un fichier texte nommé 'syslogy.cc'.
La propagation de la sale bête est classique: fichier joint dans un mail douteux ou faux fichier dans les plates-formes de 'peer-to-peer'.
Si l'utilisateur exécute le fichier contenant Spymaster.A, le cheval de Troie est copié sur l'ordinateur sous la forme d'un fichier nommé syscont.exe. Le processus associé à ce fichier s'appelle Win serviço.
Mais SpyMaster a une originalité. Pour tromper son monde, il se fait passer pour MSN Messenger dans la liste des processus en cours de d'utilisation (sous le nom msnmsgr.exe) dans le gestionnaire de tâches.
De fait, ce procédé rend les actions de Spymaster.A totalement transparentes pour l'utilisateur. De plus, le virus crée plusieurs entrées dans la base de registre de Windows pour s'assurer qu'il sera lancé à chaque démarrage de l'ordinateur.
 


Arnaque on-line :

Un jeune homme caché sous le pseudonyme de Kernel P proposait sur son site un logiciel aux propriétés extraordinaires pour quiconque se reconnaît dans la description ci-dessus.
Ce logiciel se disait en effet capable de retrouver sur simple indication d'une adresse Hotmail le mot de passe de cette dernière, vous donnant alors accès à une quantité d'informations sur la victime.
Tout ce qu'il y avait à faire était donner l'adresse en question et d'attendre une heure, le temps que le programme fasse sa petite recherche.
Mais ce programme, outre l'outil rêvé du pirate en herbe, se révélait être une formidable arnaque.
Proposé uniquement après paiement d'un système ALLOPASS, le logiciel renfermait en réalité un cheval de Troie, rendant du coup votre ordinateur vulnérable, et certainement pas celui de la personne que vous tenterez d'ennuyer.
Mais le manque de commun de la chose, c'est que l'auteur a poussé la "plaisanterie" un peu plus loin, puisque son site, aujourd'hui fermé, affiche fièrement la phrase : " Merci à tous ceux qui ont participé au financement de mes vacances ! :) Joyeuses fêtes de fin d'année ! "
Plaisanterie à part, il faut tout de même garder à l'esprit que ce genre d'acte est condamné par la loi, d'une part pour incitation à l'intrusion sans permission dans un système, d'autre part pour la diffusion d'un virus.
 


Hacking :

17000 PC Zombie grâce au ver rootkit AIM
Identifié le 28 octobre dernier, peu avant Halloween, "Oscarbot B" ou "Doyorg" est un ver dit "rootkit" (lockx.exe) se propageant auprès des utilisateurs AIM. Le 17 Novembre dernier, FaceTime Communications, une société spécialisée dans la sécurité informatique, indiquait qu'un groupe de "hackers" aurait pris le contrôle de plus de 17000 ordinateurs, grâce à ce ver, dans le monde.
Une fois le PC infecté, les pirates ont accès aux données personnelles qu'il contient et peuvent en prendre le contrôle, le transformant en PC Zombie, via le protocole IRC (Internet Relay Chat), pour former un réseau de ces drôles de bêtes dont tout le monde parle depuis quelques temps.
Diagnostique de l'infection
Pour se propager, le ver a infecté un PC, transformé alors en PC Zombie, munit du logiciel de Messagerie Instantanée (IM) d'AOL inc., AIM (AOL Instant Messenger). Il a ensuite envoyé un message à tous les contacts AIM enregistrés sur ce PC composé de ces quelques mots : "Hey Check this out" ("Hey, regarde ça !") avec un lien qui conduit sur site possédant un Cheval de Troie (spyware). Les utilisateurs qui ont cliqué sur le lien ont alors vu leur ordinateur infecté par le spyware se trouvant sur ce site, permettant l'intrusion du ver à son tour. Les contacts de ces mêmes utilisateurs ont alors reçu le même message menant au même site Internet. Lorsque le ver est sur le PC, il ouvre un accès IRC permettant alors aux pirates d'en prendre le contrôle.
Il est donc conseillé de mettre à jour son antivirus et de ne pas cliquer sur les liens des messages en anglais ou qui vous paraissent suspects. Les mêmes conseils que pour les mails que vous pourriez recevoir en somme.
 


Le piratage par les pirates...


FaceTime Communications a identifié les "hackers", à l'origine du ver et de la prise de contrôle des PC Zombie, comme étant originaires du Moyen-Orient. utilisant le réseau Bit Torrent, ils utiliseraient des spywares pour infecter les ordinateurs et auraient pu prendre le contrôle d'un serveur. Ce serveur aurait alors permis d'infecter plus de 17000 PC, les transformant en PC Zombie. Si d'autres serveurs sont infectés, on peut imaginer qu'il y aura également plusieurs dixaines de milliers de PC qui le seront à leur tour.
La société californienne FaceTime Communications a alerté le Bureau américain des enquêtes (FBI).
 



Lupper, le ver qui attaque Linux ?


Lupper... Ce petit nom vient de faire son apparition sur la toile, et c'est la société experte en sécurité informatique qui l'a donné à un petit ver qui a une petite particularité à laquelle peu de virus dans son genre peuvent prétendre : il s'attaque à certains serveurs Web, et plus particulièrement à ceux situés sur les systèmes Linux...
Mais comment est-ce possible ?
Selon McAfee, le ver exploite les failles contenues dans certains scripts sur les serveurs Web pour se répandre.
Il attaque les serveurs en tentant d'installer une copie de lui-même lorsqu'il trouve un serveur vulnérable, copie qui va ensuite être exécutée.
Les serveurs infectés se voient alors ouvrir une porte dérobée (backdoor) qui peut potentiellement donner à un attaquant un accès sur le système compromis.
Ainsi, le serveur peut se connecter à un réseau de machines elles-mêmes compromises pour, par exemple, effectuer des attaques contre une ou plusieurs cibles particulières.
Le ver exploite exactement trois vulnérabilités : une dans le protocole XML-RPC permettant l'injection de code, une dans la validation de paramètres via AWStats, et une dernière permettant l'exécution de code à distance.
Un danger limité
Les deux premières de ces trois failles ont été découvertes et corrigées depuis maintenant plusieurs mois, mais Symantec, qui a baptisé le ver « Plupii » de son côté affirme que la troisième sur cette liste n'a toujours pas connu de correctif.
La menace reste cependant très modérée, puisque Symantec par exemple précise que le ver est peu répandu.
Certains cas d'infections ont cependant pu être constatés.
 


JuNy.b :


Doté du joli nom de JuNy.b, il s'agit d'une nouvelle variante d'un virus déjà bien connu de nos voisins russes.Une fois arrivé sur votre système, il crypte vos données personnelles et vous empêche d'y accéder.Vous allez donc avoir besoin d'un moyen pour décrypter vos fichiers, et c'est là que les choses deviennent vraiment compliquées.
Les données cryptées, le virus créé un fichier texte dans lequel il invite sa victime à contacter ses créateurs par e-mail afin d'obtenir la clé nécessaire à la récupération de ses données.
Ainsi, la victime apprendra qu'elle devra payer pour obtenir la fameuse clé qui lui ramènera ses fichiers.
Le renouvellement d'un concept :
Ce type de virus n'est pas vraiment nouveaux.
Certains comme la première version de celui-ci ont déjà parcouru la toile, demandant des rançons similaires pour libérer les données concernées.
En mai dernier, la première variante de JuNy demandait la somme de 200 dollars...
 

 

publié par Adel publié dans : Haking

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